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"A beneficiary, about to plunge into a ruinous course of dealing,
may be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken word."'

I.

Introduction.
A participant in an employer-sponsored

health care plan

organization 2

(MCO) who suffers

administered by a managed care

harm as a consequence of an adverse treatment decision made by a
health care provider has several legal options. The most common
option may be to file a medical malpractice claim against the
treating physician under state law. Plan participants may also sue
MCOs in state court under theories of direct3 or vicarious tort
liability.4 However, participants have often found that their state
law claims against MCOs are pre-empted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),5 which
supersedes state laws relating to employer-sponsored health care

plans.6
In Herdrich v. Pegram,7 a 1998 Seventh Circuit decision, a plan
participant whose state law cause of action was pre-empted by
ERISA was granted leave to pursue a claim against an MCO on the
theory of breach of ERISA fiduciary duty.8 The claimed breach
arose from the inherent conflict between the ERISA fiduciary's
duty to act solely in the interest of the participant, on the one hand,
and the MCO's use of financial incentives to control costs by
limiting treatment provided to participants, on the other.9 Herdrich
appeared to provide plaintiffs whose state law claims were preempted by ERISA with a new option for recovery. However, the
1. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.).
2. Managed care involves integration of the provision and financing of health
care. See Part II.A, infra, for a discussion of various managed care models. This
comment will focus on the health maintenance organization (HMO) model.
3. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996) (allowing plaintiff's complaint that
an HMO had breached its duty to use reasonable care in the selection, retention
and evaluation of primary care physicians).
4. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (finding an HMO liable for the negligence of a physician hired as an
independent consultant); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 123435 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that when a patient looks to the HMO, and not
solely to the treating physicians, for care, the HMO may be liable under principles
of ostensible agency).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
7. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
8. See id. at 372-73.
9. See id. at 371-72.
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unanimous decision of the United States Supreme Court in Pegram
v. Herdrich,'° which reversed the Seventh Circuit," closed this
particular avenue for plaintiffs. Nevertheless, another cause of
action may still exist under ERISA. If a plan participant can prove
that the MCO failed to disclose a conflict between the use of
financial incentives and the physician-employee's treatment
decision, and such failure had a material impact on the participant's
individual situation, a cause of action may be brought for breach of
the ERISA fiduciary duty of disclosure. 2
This comment addresses the question whether a federal cause
of action for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty may be brought
against an MCO after Pegram v. Herdrich, the nature of that cause
of action, and the benefit to the plaintiff who brings such an action.
Part Two discusses the emergence of the MCO as the dominant
model of health care delivery in the United States and the central
role of physician incentives in managed health care. It also
examines the intersection of ERISA fiduciary law and managed
health care, focusing particularly on ERISA pre-emption of state
law, the ERISA fiduciary, the nature of ERISA fiduciary duty, how
ERISA fiduciary duty applies in the context of managed health
care, and remedies for breach. Part Three examines Herdrich v.
Pegram and the expansion of ERISA liability created by the
Seventh Circuit decision in that case. This part also explains and
analyzes Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court response to that
expansion of liability.
Part Four first addresses the question whether a federal cause
of action for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty based on an MCO's
use of physician incentives survives Pegram. It concludes that
although the Court effectively closed the door on claims for breach
of ERISA statutory fiduciary duty arising from use of physician
incentives, it did not preclude claims against an MCO for failure to
disclose its physician incentive arrangements. Part Four next
examines Shea v. Esensten,13 the leading case standing for the
proposition that an HMO's failure to disclose physician incentives
is an ERISA fiduciary breach, and concludes that Shea creates a
It then examines
relatively limited disclosure requirement.
decisions rejecting the concept of an ERISA duty of disclosure, and
concludes that they can be distinguished from Shea. Part Four then

10.
11.
12.
13.

530 U.S. 211 (2000).
Id. at 218.
See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997).
107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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argues that because the Shea disclosure requirement may be
difficult to implement in practice, and courts generally have been
unwilling to impose a broader disclosure requirement, the
appropriate solution may be a statutory disclosure requirement.
Finally, Part Four examines remedies available under ERISA. It
concludes that the express remedy provided to participants,
recovery of plan benefits, is inadequate, and that a better
alternative may be to seek injunctive relief to prevent further
harmful non-disclosure of the HMO's physician incentive arrangements.
Nevertheless, because the statutory remedies are
inadequate, the best alternative for plaintiffs is avoidance of
ERISA pre-emption entirely-a task that may have become easier
after Pegram, which arguably has narrowed the scope of ERISA
pre-emption.
II.

Background: Managed Health Care and ERISA Fiduciary
Law.

A.

The Managed Care Model of Health Care Delivery.

The past three decades have witnessed a dramatic shift in how
health care is delivered to privately-insured persons in the United
States. In 1970, as today, the overwhelming majority of privatelyinsured Americans were participants in plans offered by employers
as a benefit. 4 What has changed is the typical model of health care
delivery." In 1970, most employer-sponsored plan participants
belonged to traditional "indemnity" or "fee-for-service" plans,
under which the employee ("participant")16 was free to choose a
physician ("provider"), the provider was free to offer medical care
without restriction, and the insurer served as a passive intermediary

14.

See

INSURANCE

WILLIAM S. CUSTER & PAT KETSCHE, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH
COVERAGE 9 (2000), available at http://www.hiaa.org/news/news-

state/news-state.htm.
This study commissioned by the Health Insurance
Association of America found that in 1999, more than 172 million persons,
representing 62.8% of all Americans (and 88.9% of all privately-insured
Americans), were covered by employer-sponsored health care plans.
15. For a discussion of the emergence of managed care as the dominant form
of health care delivery in the United States, see Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift
Toward Managed Care and Emerging Liability Claims Arising from Utilization
Management and FinancialIncentive Arrangements Between Health Care Providers
and Payers, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 155 (1997).
16. The term "participant" as used in this comment refers to both employeeparticipants in employer-sponsored health care plans and their dependent
beneficiaries.
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between the provider and the employer ("sponsor"). 7 Today, the

traditional indemnity plan has been replaced as the dominant form
of health care delivery by the managed care model.18 Managed care
has been defined as a system that integrates the financing and
delivery of comprehensive health care through contracts with
selected physicians and hospitals in which an attempt is made to
control costs by controlling the provision of services.' 9 Under the
managed care model, the participant's freedom to choose a
provider is restricted, and the provider is subject to varying

constraints on his ability to deliver medical services."
Managed care encompasses a broad and continually expanding
variety of health care plans, but these plans share one or more
common features. These features include a contractual obligation

on the part of the plan to arrange for medical care, limitations on
the participant's ability to select a provider, controls on the
provider's medical treatment choices, and assumption of financial
risk by providers." While the universe of managed care organizations can be divided into categories reflecting the presence or
absence of the aforementioned features,22 neat categorization is

difficult. 3 The most common categories include: (1) the managed

17. See Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de Lissavoy, Razing a Tower of Babel:
A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 75, 76 (1993).
18. See infra note 30.
19. John K. Iglehart, Physicians and the Growth of Managed Care, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1167 (1994).
20. See id.
21. See Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 84-86. While the insurer
traditionally served as an intermediary responsible primarily for bill payment, the
insurer's contractual obligations have expanded in the managed care setting. Id. at
76-78. Generally, the insurer is legally committed to arranging for provision of
care by providers in its network; in some instances, where the insurer is fully
integrated with the physician group, the insurer provides medical services directly.
See id. at 85. In contrast to the traditional indemnity model, under which
participants' freedom to choose providers is unlimited, all managed care systems
restrict that choice to some extent. See id. at 84. A common feature of all
managed care plans is a system of utilization controls, the paramount objective of
which is to contain costs. See id.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
23. See generally Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think
About "Managed Care," 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661 (1999). Although Hacker and
Marmor agree that managed care represents a fusion of two formerly separate
functions, the financing of medical care and its delivery, id. at 670, they reject the
categorization scheme offered by Weiner and de Lissavoy, id. Hacker and
Marmor argue that there are just two "crucial distinguishing features" of MCOs:
(1) whether plans require that participants see only certain specified providers
(pure HMOs do; open HMOs do, but allow participants to opt out; PPOs and
MIPs do not); (2) whether physicians bear financial risk. Id. at 670-71.
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indemnity plan (MIP), under which insurers place utilization
controls on the providers whom they reimburse, but neither assume
an obligation to arrange service nor restrict participants' choice of
provider;24 (2) the preferred provider organization (PPO), in which
providers contract with the PPO to provide services at reduced feefor-service rates,25 providers' practice choices are restricted by
means of utilization controls, and participants are channeled
towards PPO providers through financial incentives (but remain
free to choose an out-of-network provider at standard fee-forservice rates);26 (3) the "pure" or closed-network health maintenance organization (HMO), which assumes the obligation to provide
service, limits participants' choice of provider to HMO-affiliated
physicians, and subjects providers' practice choices to significant
controls; 27 (4) the "open" HMO variant, which restricts providers'
practice choices, but allows participants to go outside the network
for care at fee-for-service rates. 28 Because the MCO at issue in the
Pegramcase was an HMO, 29 and because of the gaining prominence
of the HMO model of health care delivery, ° this comment will
focus on the HMO model.
The HMO can be defined as a health care delivery system in
which participants pay a fixed premium in return for a predetermined menu of benefits from authorized providers selected by the
HMO' Viewed from an organizational perspective, there are four
principal types of HMO: staff-, group-, network-, and independent
practice association- or IPA-model.3 2 In the staff-model HMO,
providers are full-time salaried employees who provide services
exclusively to plan participants.33 In the group-model HMO, a
multi-specialty practice group contracts with the HMO to provide

24. See Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 98.
25.
26.

See id. at 100.
See id. at 99-100.

27. See id. at 96.
28. See id. at 99.
29. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 215 (2000).
30. The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to
300e-17, allowed the formation of HMOs that assume financial risk for the
provision of health care services. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233. By 1978, 203
HMOs enrolled 7.5 million participants.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

651 HMOs enrolled 64.8 million participants.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1985 (105th ed. 1984). By 1998,

U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

1999 (119th ed. 1999).

31. See Battaglia, supra note 15, at 179.
32. See id. at 180-83.
33. See Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 100-01.
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exclusive or non-exclusive services to participants.34 The networkmodel HMO is similar to the group-model HMO, but includes
more than one practice group.35 Under the IPA model, individual
physicians contract with an IPA, which in turn contracts with one or
more HMOs for provision of non-exclusive care to participants. 6
In the HMO model, virtually all costs associated with provision
of services must be recovered from premiums paid, although excess
costs, to some degree, can be passed on to sponsors and participants
in the form of higher future premiums.37 This assumption of
financial risk creates a powerful incentive for HMOs to limit costs
to the greatest extent possible. Common cost-control measures
include coverage determinations, issuance of guidelines to
providers about appropriate levels of care, utilization review, in
which specific treatment decisions are reviewed by someone other
than the provider, and pre-approval of certain types of treatment.
These measures are complemented by compensation arrangements
under which the incentive to control costs is extended to the
provider, who shares in the financial risk associated with failure to
achieve cost efficiency.39
B. The Use of Physician Incentives in the HMO Model of Managed
Health Care.
1. Principal Types of Physician Incentives Used by HMOsHMOs use two principal methods to pay providers: salary and
capitation.4 ° The salary method is more common in staff- and
group-model HMOs, while capitation, under which the provider is
responsible for care of a specified number of patients and is paid a
predetermined fee for each patient, is more common in plans that
contract for only a part of a provider's time." Under either method,
the provider's compensation remains constant regardless of the
level of care provided to each patient; therefore, the provider has a
financial incentive to limit treatment.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See id. at 96.
See id. at 98-99.
See id. at 97.
See id. at 82-84.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,219 (2000).
See Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 82-84.
See David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial

Incentives to Limit Care,30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155,158 (1996).

41.
42.

See id. at 158-59.
See id. at 159.
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The provider's financial incentive to limit care is brought into
sharp focus by the devices used by HMOs to control the provision
of ancillary medical services such as diagnostic tests and referrals to
other physicians with specialized expertise. Because the provider's
compensation does not increase in proportion to the services
provided, she has an incentive to minimize her own services and
rely more heavily on ancillary services.4'3 To prevent providers from
overusing ancillary services, plans rely on devices such as bonuses,
fee withholds, and expanded capitation.' Regardless of the method
used, the effect is the same: by limiting provision of ancillary
services, the provider can increase her income. The HMO's use of
financial incentives in this manner creates an inherent conflict with
the provider's traditional duty to act in the best interest of the
patient. 5 If the provider also has discretionary authority with
respect to the plan itself, as in the case of a physician-owned HMO,
this conflict may also implicate the fiduciary duties of the plan
administrator under ERISA."
2. Liability Claims Against HMOs Based on Use of Physician
Incentives-Despite the readily apparent conflict between HMOs'
use of physician incentives to control costs and the physician's
traditional duty to act in the best interest of the patient, relatively
few claims have been brought against HMOs for liability arising
from this conflict of interest. In Bush v. Dake,47 an unreported
Michigan case, the plaintiff alleged that an HMO's system of
financial incentives provided its physicians with a financial
disincentive to properly treat and refer patients that violated public
policy.48 Although the Bush court found no violation of public
policy, it did find that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
43. See id. at 159-60.
44. See id. at 160. Under the bonus system, the plan typically sets aside a pool
of funds each year to pay for ancillary services; any residual balance is paid back to
plan providers in the form of a year-end bonus. See id. Under the fee-withhold
system, part of the provider's compensation is withheld and placed in a pool to pay
for ancillary services; residual amounts are returned to the provider at year-end.
See id. With expanded capitation, the capitation payment covers both the
provider's own and ancillary services, and the provider is responsible for the cost
of ancillary services provided to patients. See id.
45. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Managed Care, Conflicts of Interest, and Quality,

30 HASTINGS
46.

CENTER REP.

27 (2000).

See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S.

211 (2000).
47.

No. 86-25767 NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989). An edited version of

this opinion appears in

BARRY

R.

FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW

(American

Casebook Series, 3d ed. 1997) at page 292.

48. See
2000).

BARRY

R. FURROW

ET AL., HEALTH LAW

399 (Hornbook Series, 2d ed.
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whether the incentive system proximately contributed to the
alleged malpractice of the provider. 9 Other courts that have heard
similar complaints have refused to find liability based on use of
financial incentives alone. ° In many cases, courts have simply
refused to consider the issue of whether physician incentives, an
essential element of the HMO system,5 violate public policy or

contributed to the alleged malpractice. 2
Although courts generally have been reluctant to allow tort
claims against HMOs based on their use of physician incentives,
several courts have allowed claims against HMOs on the theory

that use of physician incentives constitutes a breach of the fiduciary
duties imposed by ERISA

3

In Shea v. Esensten,54 the Eighth

Circuit held that when an HMO's system of financial incentives
discourages a provider from making essential referrals for
conditions covered by the plan, failure to disclose such incentives to
the participant is a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty.5
In Herdrich v. Pegram 6 the Seventh Circuit allowed a plaintiff
to pursue a claim against an HMO for breach of ERISA fiduciary
duty on the basis of its use of physician incentives.57 The court held

that an HMO's use of an incentive system can rise to the level of a
breach of ERISA fiduciary duty when physicians delay or withhold

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Sweede v. Cigna Healthplan of Del., Inc., 1989 WL 12608, at *5
(Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1989). In Sweede, a malpractice claim was brought against
a primary care provider for negligent failure to make a timely referral to a
specialist in which the plaintiff alleged that the delay was influenced by financial
incentives under a capitation/fee-withhold arrangement. Id. at *1. The court
found that any connection between the incentive arrangement and the provider's
referral decision was too remote to be of significant probative value. Id. at *5.
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994). The Health Maintenance
Organization Act of 1973 specifically requires the use of such incentives as a means
of controlling the cost of health care. See id. § 300e.
52. See, e.g., McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1056 n.6
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996) ("It is settled beyond
peradventure ... that the judicial branch is precluded by constitutional mandate
from addressing the ethical, moral, or social implications of a health care program
which indirectly provides a diminished compensation for a provider who deems
further medical attention necessary or desirable. The fundamental prerogative
and duty of considering and establishing social policy, including.., the regulation
of health care providers, is vested solely in the legislature.").
53. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of
the ERISA duties of loyalty, care and disclosure, see infra notes 103-04 and text
accompanying notes 109-18.
54. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
55. Id. at 629.
56. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
57. Id. at 372-73.
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provision of proper treatment for the sole purpose of increasing
their compensation." While the Herdrich majority asserted that its
decision did not stand for the proposition that the existence of
physician incentives automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary
duty, 9 Herdrich represented an expansion of liability beyond the
holding of Shea. As such, Herdrich marked a departure from the
courts' historical reluctance to consider claims based on the
existence of physician incentive systems, and appeared to open a
new avenue of recovery for plaintiffs whose state law claims were
pre-empted by ERISA.
C. The Intersection of ERISA Fiduciary Law and Managed Health
Care.
1. ERISA Pre-emption of State Law Claims Against HMOsERISA was enacted by Congress to provide adequate and uniform
standards to ensure the financial soundness and long-term stability
of private employee benefit plans. 60 In enacting ERISA, Congress
intended primarily to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries." To accomplish these objectives, ERISA provides a
comprehensive system for the federal regulation of private
employee benefit plans, including both pension plans and welfare
plans.62
"Welfare plans" include employer-provided health
insurance plans. 63
To ensure uniform standards, ERISA contains a "pre-emption
clause" providing that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any private employee benefit plan, with limited
exceptions.' The Court has indicated that the key to the pre58. Id. at 373.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.

125, 127 (1992).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). The ERISA pre-emption clause states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title.
Id. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
The pre-emption clause is followed by a "saving clause" which provides that
"nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
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emption clause is found in the phrase "relate to.

' 65

A state law

relates to an employee benefit plan "if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." 66 The Supreme Court has stated that the
"deliberately expansive" language of the pre-emption clause was
designed to establish pension plan regulation as "exclusively a
federal concern., 67 However, the scope and purpose of the pre-

emption clause have been subject to conflicting interpretations by
the Supreme Court.6 An expansive view of the scope of ERISA
pre-emption is reflected in District of Columbia v. Greater
Washington Board of Trade.6 9 In Greater Washington Board of
Trade, the Supreme Court stated that ERISA pre-empts any state

law that "refers to or has a connection with covered benefit plans,"
even if the law was not specifically designed to affect such plans, or
affects them indirectly.7"
While Greater Washington Board of Trade represents a broad
view of ERISA pre-emption, a more recent decision indicates the
Court's willingness to impose a limit on ERISA's reach. In New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 71 the Court acknowledged that the text of
the pre-emption clause was "unhelpful" and that defining its key
term was frustratingly difficult; it looked instead to the objectives of
ERISA in determining the proper scope of pre-emption.7 ' The
The application of state insurance law is then limited by a "deemer clause"
which states that "[n]either an employee benefit plan... nor any trust established
under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer
... or to be engaged in the business of insurance... for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)
(1994). Therefore, state laws governing or relating to employer-provided health
insurance plans are subject to ERISA pre-emption.
65. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990).
66. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). Congress used
equally broad language in defining which state laws would be pre-empted by
ERISA, including "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action
having the effect of law." Ingersoll-Rand Co., 498 U.S. at 138-39 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1994)).
67. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
68. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-CreatingAuthority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355,
384 (1994).
69. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
70. Id. at 129-30. The Court noted, however, that pre-emption does not occur
"if the state law has only a 'tenuous, remote, or peripheral' connection with
covered plans, as is the case with many laws of general applicability." Id. at 130 n.1
(quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
71. 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
72. See id. The Court noted that if the term "relate to" were "taken to extend
to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-
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Court found that the purpose of ERISA pre-emption was "to avoid
a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit a nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans."73 The Court also
recognized that "the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by [ERISA] unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. 7 4 Finally, the Court emphasized that preemption does not occur if the state law in question "has only a
tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection" with an ERISA plan, as
is frequently the case with state laws of general applicability.75
In practice, the ERISA pre-emption clause has often been used
by welfare plan managers, including HMOs, as a defense against
liability for the negligent acts of their employees or agents. 76 As a
consequence of courts' acceptance of that defense, state-law tort
claims against HMOs have often been pre-empted by ERISA.77 On
the other hand, some courts have found state tort law claims to be
too remotely connected with ERISA welfare plans for the preemption clause to take effect." Nevertheless, the plaintiff whose
emption would never run its course" because relations are infinite. Id. at 655.
73. Id. at 657.
74. Id. at 655.
75. Id. at 661 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of
Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992)). However, Blue Cross did not attempt to
explain which state laws are so tenuously connected to employee benefit plans that
ERISA pre-emption does not apply.
76. See Pittman, supra note 68, at 359-61.
77. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys. of Pa., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D.
Pa. 1994). The Dukes court reasoned that a negligence claim against an HMO
based on an agency theory involves a determination of whether the HMO held out
the provider as its employee; any claim based on "such references, descriptions, or
explanations is 'related to' the benefit plan," and "matters relating to a benefit
plan are pre-empted by ERISA." Id. The court further reasoned that a
malpractice claim involves a question of "relating plan performance to planpromise, and is therefore pre-empted by ERISA." Id. Other courts have reached
similar conclusions. E.g., Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that state law claims of medical malpractice against an
HMO were pre-empted because the ERISA plan in question directed plaintiff's
decedent to the HMO-affiliated physician for medical care and governed the
treatment that the physician was to provide).
78. See, e.g., Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185-86 (E.D.
Pa. 1994). The Kearney court noted that "a claim that one was denied a promised
benefit is preempted. A claim that one received a promised service from a
provider who performed that service negligently is another matter." Id. at 186.
State law vicarious liability claims against HMOs based on common-law tort and
agency principles should be permitted for the same reason. See id. at 187.
Several other courts have permitted negligence claims against HMOs alleging
vicarious liability to proceed on grounds that these claims "have nothing to do with
a denial of rights under a benefit plan since they do not affect the regulatory
scheme devised by Congress in ERISA and thus are not sufficiently 'related to'
ERISA so as to warrant pre-emption." Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Sys. of Pa., 848
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state law claim is held to be pre-empted by ERISA may have no
other alternative than to state an ERISA claim. Because ERISA
imposes fiduciary duties on the managers and administrators of
welfare plans, 79 and allows plan participants to bring a cause of
action against plan fiduciaries for breach of these duties,' one way
for a plaintiff to overcome ERISA pre-emption of a state law claim
is to show a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty.
2. The ERISA Fiduciary-An ERISA fiduciary is defined in

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) as a person who (1) exercises discretionary
authority or discretionary control with respect to management of an
ERISA plan; (2) renders for compensation, or has authority to
render, investment advice with respect to the funds or property of

an ERISA plan; or (3) has discretionary authority or responsibility

in the administration of an ERISA plan.81 Generally, courts apply a

functional test in determining who is an ERISA fiduciary: they will
look at a person's actions, as opposed to the official designation of
his role, in determining fiduciary status under ERISA.' The key
criterion in the application of this functional test is whether a
person exercises discretion with respect to the management, assets
or administration of an ERISA plan.83 In other words, a person is a
fiduciary only to the extent that he exercises discretion with respect

to one of the three functions stated in § 1002(21)(A).'

A person

who performs purely ministerial functions in respect of plan
administration is not an ERISA fiduciary.85 For liability to attach
F. Supp. 39, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1994). E.g., Elsesser v. Hosp. of the Phila. Coll. of
Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Independence HMO v.
Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983,988 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). In addition to the statutory duty of loyalty
imposed by § 1104(a), discussed infra at notes 103-04, ERISA incorporates
common-law fiduciary duty, discussed infra at notes 101-02.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
82. See Acosta v. Pac. Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991). See also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) ("[O]ne is a
fiduciary to the extent he exercises any discretionary authority or control.")
(emphasis in original); Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1991)
("In determining who is a fiduciary under ERISA, courts consider whether a party
has exercised discretionary authority or control over a plan's management, assets,
or administration.").
83. See Confer, 952 F.2d at 36.
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-16A (2000) ("A fiduciary with respect to [a]
plan who is not a named fiduciary is a fiduciary only to the extent that he or she
performs one or more of the functions described in [29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)J. The
personal liability of a fiduciary who is not a named fiduciary is generally limited to
the fiduciary functions, which he or she performs with respect to the plan.").
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2 (2000) (listing ministerial functions, the
performance of which does not meet the test of ERISA fiduciary status).
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under ERISA, there must be a nexus between the alleged breach
and the exercise of discretion by the fiduciary.' A fiduciary may be
an individual or another legal person such as a corporation. 7 Some
courts have found HMOs to fall within the definition of ERISA
fiduciary.'
3. ERISA Fiduciary Duty in the Context of Managed Health

Care-ERISA governs employee "welfare" plans, including any
plan "established or maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise.., medical, surgical, or hospital care or

benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, [or]
To determine whether a particular employerdisability."'
health
care plan is an ERISA plan, courts generally
sponsored
apply the Fort Halifax test.' This test requires that a plan have an
administrative scheme or a set of administrative practices or
procedures under which it operates to fall under ERISA. 91 Because
employer-sponsored plans typically have such an administrative
scheme, 92 they generally qualify as ERISA plans.
Assuming a plan is governed by ERISA, the next step in
determining whether ERISA fiduciary duty exists is to determine
whether the plan, or any affiliated person, performs any of the
three stated functions93 of an ERISA fiduciary. Under this test, an
HMO that offers or administers a plan 94 may be found to be an
ERISA fiduciary.9
Courts have also found employers who
86. See, e.g., Marks v. Independence Blue Cross, 71 F. Supp. 2d. 432, 434 (E.D.
Pa. 1999) (stating that an insurance company could be found liable for breach of
ERISA fiduciary duty only if it performed discretionary functions for a health plan
and those functions are related to the breach claimed by the plaintiffs).
87. Confer, 952 F.2d at 36.
88. See, e.g., Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
90. See, e.g., Keystone Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors v. Foley,
37 F.3d 945, 954 (3d Cir. 1994).
91. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1987).
92. See generally Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 76-80.
93. These functions are listed in text accompanying note 81, supra.
94. The term "plan" is sometimes used to refer to the HMO itself; however, a
distinction should be made between the plan and the HMO. Typically the HMO
administers a plan on behalf of the employer-sponsor of the plan, and many
HMOs administer large numbers of plans. For a discussion of the wide variety of
health care plans in existence, see Weiner & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 76-78.
95. See Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that an HMO can be an ERISA fiduciary to the extent that it exercises any
discretionary authority or control in respect of the management or administration
of the plan). By its nature, an HMO administering a health care plan will meet the
statutory definition of an ERISA fiduciary in almost every case.
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assumed a role in the management or administration of their health
care plans to be ERISA fiduciaries. 96
Conceivably, individual providers and provider organizations
such as IPAs could also qualify as ERISA fiduciaries under some

circumstances'
In almost every case, providers and provider
organizations perform certain administrative functions with respect
to the plan under the terms of their contracts. 98 However, to the

extent that the providers and provider organizations perform
administrative or ministerial functions "within a framework of
policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by
other persons," they are not fiduciaries. 99 While individual

providers, by definition, exercise considerable discretion regarding
patient treatment decisions, these decisions typically would not
involve an exercise of discretion in respect of the management,
assets, or administration of the plan itself.

Likewise, provider

organizations necessarily exercise discretion with regard to the
management of their own business, but these decisions would be

distinct from exercises of discretion relating to the plan. Regardless
of the plan's administrative scheme and the roles played by
providers and provider organizations, the key to every inquiry into
ERISA fiduciary status remains the exercise of discretion over the
management, administration or assets of the plan.'"
4. The Nature of ERISA Fiduciary Duty-ERISA fiduciary
duty is rooted in, and incorporates, the common law of trusts, 1
96. See Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 234 (3d Cir.
1994) (finding that an employer who administered a plan through its employee
relations department had the sole discretion to modify, amend, or terminate the
plan, and retained the right of approval of employees' assignment of benefits
exercised sufficient discretion to satisfy the statutory test); cf. Confer v. Custom
Eng'g Co., 952 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that while an employer exercised
sufficient discretionary authority over its health care plan to qualify as an ERISA
fiduciary, ERISA does not automatically extend that status to the individual
officers through whom the employer acted).
97. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000) ("[Fliduciary obligations
can apply to managing, advising, and administering an ERISA plan.").
98. See generally Wiener & de Lissavoy, supra note 17, at 76-80.
99. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2 (2000).
100. See Curcio, 33 F.3d at 233 ("[T]he linchpin of fiduciary status under
ERISA is discretion.").
101. See Cent. States, Southwest & Southeast Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985). The Court noted that when Congress
enacted ERISA, "rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties
of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to
define the general scope of their authority and responsibility. Id. The Court also
stated that 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) essentially codifies and makes applicable to ERISA
fiduciaries "certain principles developed in the evolution of the common law of
trusts." See id. at 570 n.10. See also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224 (noting that statutory
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which imposes upon the trustee, inter alia, duties of loyalty, care,
and disclosure. 2
In addition, ERISA specifically imposes a
statutory duty of loyalty on the fiduciary, who is required to act
"solely in the interest" of plan participants and beneficiaries. 3 The
applicable standard of care is that of the prudent person.'" Courts
have interpreted the ERISA duty of loyalty as one of "complete
and undivided loyalty" to plan participants.'
While the scope of
this duty is broad, it is not unlimited. Some courts have held that it
is permissible for an ERISA fiduciary to take actions that
incidentally benefit the fiduciary or the plan sponsor, provided the
actions were taken with the best interest of the plan participants in
mind.'" ERISA itself contemplates that fiduciaries may also have
interests adverse to those of plan participants."° However, ERISA

fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA "have the familiar ring of their source in the
common law of trusts").
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 173-74 (1959). Section
170, addressing the duty of loyalty, provides that "[t]he trustee is under a duty to
the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Id.

§ 170.
The trustee's duty of care is stated in Section 174, which provides that "[t]he
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his
own property." Id. § 174.
Section 173 addresses the duty of disclosure, stating that "[t]he trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to give him upon his request.., complete and
accurate information as to the nature and amount of trust property." Id. § 173.
Comment d to section 173 explains that while ordinarily the trustee has no duty to
provide information absent a request, the trustee is obligated "to communicate to
the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he
knows the beneficiary does not know and which the beneficiary needs to know for
his protection in dealing with a third person with respect to his interest." Id. § 173,
cmt. d.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). Section 1104(a)(1)(A) provides that an
ERISA fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan." Id.
104. See id. Section 1104(a)(1)(B) requires fiduciaries to act "with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." Id.
105. See Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 123 (7th Cir. 1984), affd, 858 F.2d 361
(7th Cir. 1988). See also Donovan v. Bierwith, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that ERISA fiduciaries must make decisions in respect of the plan "with
an eye single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries").
106. See Bierwith, 680 F.2d at 271.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (1994). This section provides that "[n]othing in
section 1106 of this title [governing prohibited transactions] shall be construed to
prohibit any fiduciary from.., serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer,
employee, agent, or other representative of a party in interest. Id. A "party in
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requires that a fiduciary who "wears two hats" avoid conflicts of
interest by acting solely as a fiduciary when making fiduciary

decisions."
Some courts have found that ERISA imposes on fiduciaries a
duty of disclosure.' °9 In Howe v. Varity Corp.," the Eighth Circuit
held that an employer breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the

beneficiaries of an employer-sponsored welfare plan by misrepresenting material facts about the administration of the plan."' The
Howe court then went a step further and stated that "a fiduciary
can also have a duty to disclose.. 12 The Eighth Circuit cited, with
approval, the earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in
Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.,"3 which stated that "[a]

fiduciary has a duty not only to inform a beneficiary of new and
relevant information as it arises, but also to advise him of

circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the relationship.". 4
The Eddy court found the duty to disclose "complete and correct
material information" about the plan attached not only upon a

participant's request, but in some circumstances,

upon the

fiduciary's own initiative.15 While the court did not explicitly
address the circumstances under which voluntary disclosure would
be required, the fair implication of the court's statement is that
"circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the relationship"
would trigger the requirement. The Third Circuit has addressed
this point more explicitly, holding that when a fiduciary is aware
interest" includes the plan sponsor. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(C) (1994).
108. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443-44 (1999).
109. E.g., Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516 U.S.
489 (1996); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300 (3d Cir. 1993); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
110. 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994).
111. See id. at 753-54, 756.
112. Id. at 754. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Eighth Circuit
decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996), concluding that ERISA
fiduciaries must comply with the common-law duty of loyalty. See 516 U.S. at 506.
However, the Court did not need to reach the question whether ERISA fiduciaries
have a fiduciary duty to disclose information either on their own initiative or in
response to inquiries by participants. See id. The Eighth Circuit later explained its
opinion in Howe, which "made clear that the duty of loyalty requires an ERISA
fiduciary to communicate any material facts which could adversely affect a plan
member's interests." Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasis
added).
113. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
114. Id. at 750.
115. See id. at 750. For example, a fiduciary "bears an affirmative duty to
inform a beneficiary of the fiduciary's knowledge of prejudicial acts by an
employer." Id.
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that its failure to disclose material information could harm the
participant, the fiduciary has an affirmative duty to disclose such
information, even if the disclosure exceeds the scope of the
participant's request for information. "6 The Second Circuit has
been more hesitant. While it has agreed that ERISA fiduciaries
have a duty not to mislead plan participants about material facts
and to provide complete and accurate information about benefit
plans upon the participant's inquiry,"' it has declined to require
fiduciaries to disclose truthful information on their own initiative. 8
5. Remedies for Breach of ERISA Fiduciary Duty-The
remedies sought by plan participants for breach of ERISA statutory
fiduciary duty fall generally into two categories: return of profits or
restoration of losses to the plan, 9 and enforcement of rights under
the plan by participants.12 ° Participants are authorized to bring civil
actions for either type of relief by the civil enforcement provisions
of ERISA found in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 2' The first type of remedy,
return of profits or restoration of losses to the plan by the breaching
The remedy
fiduciary, is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
116. See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1300, 1302-03 (3d Cir. 1993) ("The duty to inform.., entails.., an affirmative
duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence might be harmful.... [W]hile
the beneficiary may... bear a burden of informing the fiduciary of her material
circumstance, the fiduciary's obligations will not be excused merely because she
failed to comprehend or ask about a technical aspect of the plan.").
117. See Estate of Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co., 120 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1997).
118. See Poccia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996). See also
Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Following
Poccia in holding that a fiduciary has no duty to disclose information on his own
initiative, Weiss also sought to distinguish Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993). Weiss, 972 F.
Supp. at 754. The court noted that in Bixler, the fiduciary not only failed to
disclose material information, but also provided incorrect information in response
to a specific inquiry; the resulting confusion led to denial of benefits. See id. The
Weiss court concluded that the broad duty of disclosure articulated in Bixier arose
in only the limited context in which confusion has been created by the prior actions
of a fiduciary. Id.
119. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
120. See, e.g., Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 748 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516

U.S. 489 (1996).
121. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
122. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994). Section 1109(a) provides, as pertinent:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to the plan any
profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of assets
of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable
or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal
of such fiduciary.
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provided by § 1109(a) does not inure to the benefit of the
participant, but to the benefit of the plan itself. 123 However, a
participant may bring an action against a breaching fiduciary on
behalf of the plan. 24
The remedies in the second category, which are authorized by
§ 1132(a),2 5 include recovery of benefits due under the plan and
enforcement of rights under the plan.1 26 These remedies inure to
the benefit of the individual participant.' 27 Because the relief
expressly provided is to secure benefits under the plan, participants
may not recover monetary damages.2 8 Section 1132(a) also permits
a participant to bring an action to enjoin conduct by a fiduciary that
violates ERISA or the plan, or to obtain other equitable relief to
redress such violation or enforce the provisions of the plan or the
These
employee benefit protection provisions of ERISA 29
remedies also inure to the benefit of the individual participant.3
equitable relief; compensatory
This section authorizes only
3
damages are not recoverable. '
Id. A participant is authorized to bring an action for relief under § 1109 by §
1132(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).
123. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 140-42.
124. Id. at 140 ("There can be no disagreement.., that [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)]
authorizes a beneficiary to bring an action against a fiduciary who has violated [29
U.S.C. § 1109]").
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994). Section 1132(a) provides, as pertinent:
A civil action may be brought(1) by a participant or beneficiary(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violation or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan.
Id.
126. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
127. See Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 198 (1st Cir.
1997).
128. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145-47 (1985)
(holding that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) should not be read to create an
extracontractual damage remedy).
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
130. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (holding that 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3) authorizes individualized equitable relief for breach of ERISA
fiduciary duty).
131. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255-58 (1993).
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III. The Pegram Case: The Seventh Circuit Expansion of ERISA
Fiduciary Liability and the Supreme Court Response.
A. Herdrich v. Pegram: The Seventh Circuit Expansion of ERISA
Fiduciary Liability.
Herdrich v. Pegram'32 ("Herdrich") was an appeal from a
federal district court's dismissal of a complaint that an HMO had
breached its ERISA fiduciary duty to plan participants because, by
using a system of physician incentives, it deprived participants of
proper health care and retained the resulting savings."'
The
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and allowed the plaintiff
to pursue her claim against the HMO. 3" The divided panel held
that an HMO's use of an incentive system can rise to the level of a
breach of fiduciary duty when physicians delay or withhold
provision of proper treatment for the sole purpose of increasing
their earnings."' The majority emphasized that its holding did not
stand for the proposition that the existence of physician incentives
1 6
will automatically give rise to ERISA fiduciary liability. 1
Nevertheless, Herdrich represented an expansion of liability
beyond the earlier holding of the Eighth Circuit in Shea v.
Esensten,'37 because it contemplated that the mere existence and
operation of such an incentive system could give rise to a fiduciary
breach under certain circumstances.
1. Facts and ProceduralHistory -Plaintiff Cynthia Herdrich
was a beneficiary of her husband's employer-sponsored health care
plan; defendant Lori Pegram was her primary care physician.138
Defendants Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical
Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc.
(collectively "Carle"), operated a prepaid health plan known as the
132. 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998).
133. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S.
211 (2000).
134. Id. at 372-73.
135. Id. at 373.
136. Id. Judge Flaum, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, characterized the
majority holding as concluding that "the mere existence of this asserted conflict,
without more, gives rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA." Id. at 381 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
137. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997). Shea holds that when an HMO's system of
financial incentives discourages a provider from making essential referrals for
conditions covered by the plan, failure to disclose such incentives is a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. Id. at 629.
138. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211

(2000).
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Carle Care HMO, which provided medical and hospital services."'
Carle was owned by its member physicians.'
Herdrich suffered a ruptured appendix and peritonitis as a
result of Dr. Pegram's decision to delay provision of a diagnostic
procedure after discovering an inflamed mass in the plaintiff's
abdomen; she sued Carle in state court on theories of negligence
and fraud.14' The defendants contended that the fraud counts were
pre-empted by ERISA and succeeded in removing the case to
federal court. 14 2 Herdrich's amended Count III ("the ERISA
count") alleged that the defendants, who exercised discretionary
authority over claims management, asset management, and plan
administration, had breached their statutory fiduciary duty to plan
participants and beneficiaries by depriving them of proper medical
care and retaining the resulting cost savings for themselves.143 The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the ERISA count, finding that Herdrich had
failed to identify how any of the defendants was an ERISA
fiduciary.'"
After return of a favorable jury verdict on her
negligence counts, Herdrich appealed the district court's earlier
dismissal of the ERISA count.1 5
2. The Majority Decision-Upon reviewing the defendants'
claim that Herdrich had failed to properly state a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty, the Seventh Circuit first considered whether the
HMO was an ERISA fiduciary. 146 Not surprisingly, the court
focused on the "discretionary authority or discretionary control"
language of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 4 7 The court found that the
physician-owners of Carle managed the plan, including the referral
process, the nature and duration of patient treatment, and the
extent to which participants were required to use Carle-owned

139. Id.
140. See id. at 366 n.3.
141. Id. at 365 n.1.
142. Id. at 365.
143. Id. at 366, 366 n.3. Herdrich alleged that the defendants were fiduciaries
under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which imposes personal liability for breach and requires
that the breaching party restore any losses and profits to the plan. 29 U.S.C. §
1109(a) (1994). See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of §
1109(a).
144. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211
(2000).
145. Id.
146. See id. at 369.
147. See id. at 369-70.
Section 1002(21)(A) is discussed in the text
accompanying note 81, supra.
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facilities.4 8 The owner-physicians also had the exclusive right to
decide all disputed and non-routine claims under the plan."9 On
the basis of the high degree of discretionary authority and control
exercised by the HMO in carrying out these functions, the court
found that statutory definition of an ERISA fiduciary was
satisfied.'
Next, the court considered whether the HMO's fiduciary duty
had been breached. After reciting the duty of loyalty and care
language found in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), the court concluded that
a fiduciary breaches its duty of care under this section whenever it
acts to benefit its own interests.'5' The court then examined several
cases, involving not only breach of the duties of loyalty and care,
but also breach of the duty of disclosure, which it found to be
instructive in determining whether the defendants had breached
their fiduciary duty under ERISA.'52 The court found that because
the Carle administrators vested with discretionary authority over
payment of claims and determination of the nature and duration of
care provided to participants were the same physicians eligible for
annual bonuses resulting from cost savings, a financial incentive
existed for the physician-administrators to limit care provided.'
In
her complaint, Herdrich alleged that Carle's incentive system
"invited and encouraged plan fiduciaries to place their own
interests ahead of the interests of plan beneficiaries," and claimed
that this constituted a fiduciary breach.'
The court held that
Herdrich alleged with sufficient clarity that Carle's system of

148. Id. at 370-71.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 371. See supranotes 103-04 for text of § 1104(a)(1).
152. Id. at 371-72. The Seventh Circuit relied, inter alia, upon Dasler v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 624, 632 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding that excessive
securities trading by the plan fiduciary was a breach of the duty of loyalty because
"defendants considered their own interests and commission income when making
investment decisions for the plan"); Ries v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 94 C
6180, 1995 WL 669583, at *1-7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 1995) (finding that an HMO that
was fully reimbursed by plan participants who recovered the cost of covered
expenses from other sources, but in fact had arranged to receive a substantial
discount for its share of those covered expenses, engaged in covert profiteering at
the expense of the participants in violation of the duties of loyalty and disclosure);
and Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that an
HMO breached the duty of disclosure by not disclosing to plan participants a
secret incentive structure that provided financial rewards to primary care
physicians who minimized their use of ancillary services).
153. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211

(2000).
154

Id.
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physician incentives depleted plan resources to the benefit of the
providers and possible detriment of the plan participants, and
allowed her claim to proceed.'
3. The Dissent-Judge Flaum's dissenting opinion characterized the majority's holding more broadly: that the mere existence
of a conflict arising from financial incentives to limit care gives rise
to a cause of action for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty. 5 6 While
accepting the majority's findings that Carle's physician-administrators had a financial incentive to limit care and increase their
compensation, the dissent argued that the mere existence of such
structural incentives is not enough to constitute a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty.'57 The dissent noted, first, that ERISA
contemplates some conflicts of interest on the part of its fiduciaries
because it allows plan sponsors to have their own officers or agents
serve as trustee or fiduciary. "8 Thus, dual loyalties are not per se
unlawful under ERISA. " 9 Second, the dissent cited Seventh Circuit
precedent as recognizing that market forces help reduce the risk
that the fiduciary's conflict of interest will work to the detriment of
the plan and its beneficiaries.' 6° Third, the dissent pointed out that
insofar as Herdrich's complaint alleged that the HMO's physician
incentives were excessive, it effectively invited the court to make its
own determination about appropriate incentive levels in managed
care, a task more properly left to legislative and regulatory
bodies.16 ' Finally, acknowledging that the courts do have a role in
ensuring that physician incentives are implemented in accordance
with the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA, the dissent argued
that Eighth Circuit decision in Shea v. Esensten162 properly
represented the limit in terms of imposing liability under ERISA on
plans that attempt to control costs through use of financial
incentives.'
However, the dissent refused to rule out a limited
155. Id. at 380.
156. See id. at 381 (Flaum, J., dissenting). The majority responded to Judge
Flaum's characterization of its holding with a qualification: "Our decision does not
stand for the proposition that the existence of incentives automaticallygives rise to
a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, we hold that incentives can rise to the level of a
breach where, as pleaded here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and
plan fiduciaries no longer exists." Id. at 373 (emphasis in original).
157. Id. at 380-81.
158. Id. at 381 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3)). See also quoted text of §
1108(c)(3) supra note 107.
159. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 381 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 381-83.
161. Id. at 383.
162. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
163. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 383-84 (7th Cir. 1998) (Flaum, J.,
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extension of Shea to include cases in which disclosure had been
made, but there was a "serious flaw" in the manner in16 which the
financial incentive arrangement had been implemented. I
B. Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Response to the
Seventh CircuitExpansion of ERISA Fiduciary Liability.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision handed down in
June, 2000, reversed Herdrich and held that treatment decisions
made by an HMO acting through its physician employees are not
fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA 16 1 Pegram v. Herdrich
("Pegram") immediately cast doubt upon whether, and on what
basis, a plaintiff could bring a suit against an HMO for breach of
ERISA fiduciary liability arising from its use of physician incentives
to control costs and limit treatment.
1. The Court's Analysis of Herdrich's Claim for Breach of
ERISA Fiduciary Duty-After recounting the facts and procedural
history of the case, the Court began its analysis with an examination
of the use of physician incentives and other cost-control measures
by HMOs. It then addressed Herdrich's argument that Carle's
incentive structure, under which its physician-owners were paid an
annual bonus resulting from their own decisions to ration treatment, distinguished Carle from HMOs generally, "so that reviewing
Carle's decisions under a fiduciary standard as pleaded... would
'66
not open the door to like claims about other HMO structures.
While it acknowledged that Carle's incentive structure was not
"subtle," the Court noted that no HMO could survive without some
system of physician incentives.1 67 Because the inducement to ration
care is fundamental to any HMO scheme, the Court reasoned, a
legal principle purporting to differentiate between "good and bad"
HMOs would embody a judgment about socially acceptable
medical risk."" Echoing the Herdrich dissent, the Court reasoned
that because creation of such a legal principle would require
complicated fact-finding and social judgment, the task was more

dissenting), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
164. Id. at 384 (Flaum, J., dissenting). Not surprisingly, the majority contended
in response that an incentive structure that allows physician-administrators to
simultaneously control patients' treatment and reap the profits generated by
limiting tests and referrals was exactly the sort of "serious flaw" contemplated by
the dissent. See id. at 373.
165. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 214 (2000).
166. Id. at 220.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 221.
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properly left to the legislative process.1 69 Because courts are not
equipped to establish a sound legal principle to differentiate HMOs
like Carle from all HMOs, the Court rejected Herdrich's argument;
it concluded that the kinds of decisions alleged by Herdrich to have
violated ERISA 7 ° can only be actionable under ERISA if all such
decisions by all HMOs acting through owner or employee
physicians are subject to the same claims. 7'
Having determined that the Seventh Circuit decision in
Herdrich was not limited to physician-owned HMOs such as Carle,
the Court turned its analysis to whether Carle was an ERISA
fiduciary. Noting the distinction between the administration of an
HMO's business and the HMO's administration of a plan, the
Court first stated that Carle may be a fiduciary if it administers an
ERISA plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).'
The
Court then examined the nature of ERISA fiduciary duty and its
derivation from the common law of trusts, noting that whereas the
common-law trustee "wears only his fiduciary hat when he takes
action to affect a beneficiary," ERISA permits a fiduciary to wear
several hats.'73 However, like the common-law trustee, an ERISA
fiduciary may wear only his fiduciary hat when making fiduciary
decisions. 74 Thus, the Court concluded that the threshold question
in every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty was not
whether a plan administrator's actions harmed a plan beneficiary,
but whether the administrator was performing a fiduciary function
when taking the action subject to the beneficiary's complaint15
Accepting, at least for purposes of argument, that Carle was an
ERISA fiduciary, 76 the Court then examined Carle's alleged breach
of fiduciary duty. Herdrich's complaint did not identify any specific
act by Dr. Pegram or any other Carle physician-owner as a breach;
rather, the essence of her claim was that Carle, acting through its
physician-owners, generally breached its duty to act solely in the
interest of plan participants by making decisions affecting
participants' medical treatment while under the influence of the
HMO's physician incentive structure. 77 The Court interpreted this
169. See id.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54 for a discussion of Herdrich's
complaint.
171. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 222 (2000).
172. See id. at 223.
173. Id. at 225.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 226.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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as a claim that Carle, upon becoming a fiduciary administrator of
the plan, was influenced by the annual bonus scheme immediately
and to such an extent that its fiduciary capacity was compromised,
resulting in an anticipatory breach of its fiduciary duty. 78
The Court then examined the acts of Carle's physician-owners
alleged by Herdrich to be fiduciary in nature. It identified two
types of administrative acts: "eligibility decisions," which relate to
the plan's coverage of a particular condition or procedure; and
"treatment decisions," which have to do with the appropriate
medical response to the patient's condition.1 79 The Court noted that
these decisions are often inextricable from one another, not only
because in an HMO like Carle, treatment and eligibility decisions
are made by the same person, but also because in practice eligibility
decisions cannot be separated from physicians' judgments about
reasonable treatment.'9 The Court concluded that the decisions
alleged in Herdrich's ERISA count to be fiduciary in nature were
"mixed eligibility and treatment decisions," such as when to use
diagnostic tests or make referrals to specialists, rather than pure
eligibility decisions or administrative decisions separate from
medical judgments."'
2. The Court's Analysis of the Impact of Herdrich v.
Pegram-The Supreme Court concluded, on the basis of its analysis
of Herdrich's claim, that Congress did not intend that Carle or any
other HMO be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions when acting through its
physicians."
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that
Congress is unlikely to have considered such decisions as fiduciary
in nature."' The Court found further support for its conclusion by
examining the origins of ERISA fiduciary duty in the common law
of trusts.1"
The Court noted that the common-law trustee's
fiduciary decisions relate primarily to the management of assets and
178.
179.

See id. at 227.
Id. at 228.

180. Id. Dr. Pegram's decision was precisely such a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision: she decided that Herdrich's condition did not warrant
immediate attention, which in turn meant that Carle would not cover immediate
care, whereas it would have done so had Dr. Pegram made the proper diagnosis
and determination to treat. Id.
181. See id. at 229-30.
182. See id. at 231.
183. See id. at 232. In enacting ERISA, the principal focus of Congress was on
pension plans, particularly the difficulty faced by many retirees in getting the
payments they expected and the financial mismanagement that too often had
deprived employees of their benefits. Id.
184. See id. at 224.
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payment of money on behalf of the beneficiary.'
By contrast, an
HMO physician making mixed eligibility and treatment decisions
not only draws on financial resources held by the plan, but also, by
definition, makes medical judgments that are not fiduciary in
nature.'86
The Court buttressed its conclusion that Congress would not
have categorized mixed eligibility and treatment decisions of an
HMO acting through its physicians as ERISA fiduciary actions with
an analysis of the likely impact of the Herdrich decision. If
Herdrich were applied to claims against for-profit HMOs making
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions, recovery would be
warranted upon a showing that the incentive to ration care would
generally affect mixed decisions in derogation of the fiduciary's
duty to act solely in the interest of the plan participant."8 The
Court concluded that because Herdrich sought a remedy provided
by 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), the return of profits to the plan,' and
because provision of profit is what makes an HMO a proprietary
organization, the unintended effect of the remedy would be the
elimination of the for-profit HMO. 8 9 In view of the ongoing
support in Congress for the HMO concept since enactment of the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973," the Court determined that allowance of an ERISA fiduciary liability claim which
could result in wholesale attacks on HMOs solely because of their
incentive structures would be contrary to congressional policy. 9'
Having determined that Herdrich would lead to a result
contrary to the intent of Congress, the Court next examined the
difficulties of applying the Seventh Circuit holding in practice. The
fundamental problem noted by the Court was that the fiduciary
duty to act solely in the interest of the participant cannot be
translated into a workable standard that would allow recovery from
185. See id. at 231-32.
186. Id. The distinction becomes clear when considering the example of the
health care trust. The trustee of a health care trust, who is a fiduciary under the
common law of trusts, pays money to buy medical care on the beneficiary's behalf,
but does not make judgments about the beneficiary's medical treatment. See id. at
232.
187. See id. at 232-33.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994). See also quoted text of § 1109(a) supra
note 122.
189. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233 (2000).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1994). The Act authorized formation of forprofit HMOs that assume financial risk in the provision of health care services, 530
U.S. at 233, and specifically contemplates the use of physician incentives, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300e (1994).
191. Pegram,530 U.S. at 233-34.
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an HMO whenever a mixed eligibility and treatment decision
resulted in harm." Because it would be an easy matter to find an
economic motive behind any such decision, application of the
Seventh Circuit standard would allow the finder of fact to covert an
HMO into a "guarantor of recovery."' 93 The Court suggested that
this problem may have led the Seventh Circuit to limit its holding to
situations in which physicians delay or withhold treatment solely for
the purpose of increasing their compensation.'
The Court
acknowledged that the latter kind of decision would constitute an
ERISA breach, but noted a further problem in that the ERISA
fiduciary standard, which requires a fiduciary to act "solely in the
interest" of the participant, would have a broader reach than the
Seventh Circuit holding.'95 However, the Court concluded that this
disparity ultimately did not matter, because under either standard
the HMO's defense would always be that the physician acted not on
the basis of financial interest but for valid medical reasons, the
plausibility of which would require reference to standards of
reasonable and customary medical practice under like circumstances."' Because the fiduciary standard would be identical to the
standard applied in state law medical malpractice actions, every
claim for breach of ERISA fiduciary duty by an HMO making a
mixed eligibility and treatment decision through its physician would
be reduced to a malpractice claim."9 Thus, the ultimate effect of
Herdrich would be to create a federal cause of action in what has
traditionally been a state-law matter; the chief benefit to plaintiffs
would be to make them eligible for attorneys' fees if successful in
litigation.'98
Finally, the Court noted that because the physician making a
mixed eligibility and treatment decision on behalf of an HMO
would be exercising discretionary authority as described in 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), the physician would be subject to ERISA
liability under the same analysis that would charge the HMO.'9
This in turn would raise an issue of ERISA pre-emption of state

192. See id. at 234.
193. See id. at 234-35.
194. Id. at 235.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 235-36. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) provides that "[i]n any action
under this subchapter.., the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable
attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1994).
199. See Pegram,530 U.S. at 236.
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medical malpractice law. 2°° However, the Court saw no need to
address this issue, given the direction of its arguments, and held,
first, that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions by HMO
physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, and second,
that Herdrich's ERISA count failed to state an ERISA claim. °1
IV. Does the Plan Participant Harmed by the Decision of an
HMO Operating Under a System of Physician Incentives
Have an ERISA Cause of Action After Pegram v. Herdrich?
Pegram unequivocally rejected the theory that the ERISA
fiduciary duty of loyalty is breached when an HMO, acting through
its physician owners or employees, makes a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision under a scheme in which physician incentives
are used to control costs and limit treatment. 202 Thus, a cause of
action against a physician or an HMO for breach of statutory
fiduciary duty is no longer available when the plaintiff's harm
resulted from such a mixed decision. However, the holding of
Pegram does not extend to pure eligibility decisions made by a
physician on behalf of an HMO. Nor does it address another
fiduciary duty arguably imposed by ERISA: the duty of disclosure.
This Part examines ERISA fiduciary liability arising from HMOs'
use of physician incentives after Pegram, focusing primarily on
breach of the duty of disclosure. It will also examine Shea v.
Esensten the principal case standing for the proposition that an
HMO's failure to disclose physician incentives is a fiduciary breach,
as well as cases that reject the notion of an ERISA duty of
disclosure. It concludes that Shea, if read narrowly to apply to
situations in which a plan participant has been harmed by non200. Id.
201. Id. at 237.
202. At the outset, the Pegram opinion states: "The question in this case is
whether treatment decisions made by a health maintenance organization, acting
through its physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the meaning of...
ERISA. We hold that they are not." 530 U.S. at 214 (emphasis added). At the
conclusion, the opinion states: "We hold that mixed eligibility decisions by HMO
physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA." Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
Despite the inconsistent language, it is clear from the Court's analysis in part II-F,
id. at 227-30, that its holding refers to mixed eligibility and treatment decisions, i.e.
decisions in which eligibility or coverage issues cannot be separated from the
physician's medical judgment about the patient's particular condition, see id. at
229. Pure treatment decisions, which the Court describes as "choices about how to
go about diagnosing and treating a patient's condition," id. at 228, by definition do
not relate to the health care plan, and therefore cannot be fiduciary decisions
under ERISA.
203. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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disclosure following a treatment-related inquiry, should survive a
future challenge.
A. ERISA Causes of Action Unaffected by Pegram v. Herdrich.
1. Pure Eligibility Decisions by HMOs Acting Through Their
Physicians-The Court defined a pure eligibility decision as one
relating to "the plan's coverage of a particular condition or medical
procedure for its treatment., 20' The Court noted that although
some eligibility decisions are simple "yes-or-no" questions, such as
whether appendicitis is a covered condition, the more common
coverage question is a "when and how" question, such as whether
one treatment option is so superior to another under the
circumstances that a decision to proceed with it would meet the
medical necessity requirement that conditions the HMO's
obligation to pay." The Court concluded that the latter type of
eligibility decision is, for all practical purposes, inextricably linked
to the physician's medical judgment or treatment decision, and
201
therefore constitutes a mixed eligibility and treatment decision.
Because the Court did not interpret Herdrich's ERISA count as
alleging a fiduciary breach with respect to a pure eligibility
decision,2 7 or a discrete administrative decision separate from a
medical judgment, it did not need to consider whether such
decisions could constitute a breach of the ERISA duty of loyalty.
Undoubtedly, then, a pure eligibility decision, or an
administrative decision separate from any medical judgment, could
constitute an actionable ERISA fiduciary breach in the postPegram environment. For example, if coverage were denied by an
HMO, and the denial had an economic motive, then the denial
arguably would breach the HMO's duty to act solely in the interest
of the plan participant. However, most claims made on this basis
would encounter difficulties of proof. Invariably, the HMO would
be able to use the medical judgment of the treating physician as
204. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228 (2000).
205. See id. at 228-29.
206. See id. at 229.
207. Id. at 230. The Court noted that Herdrich had alleged that Carle
determined "which claims are covered under the plan and to what extent," but
found that "this vague statement, difficult to interpret in isolation, is given content
by the other elements of the complaint, all of which refer to decisions thoroughly
mixed with medical judgment." Id. (internal citation omitted).
208. Id. The Court distinguished between "pure eligibility determinations"
(e.g., whether a condition such as appendicitis is covered by the plan) and
"administrative decisions separate from medical judgments" (e.g., rejection of a
claim for no other reason than the financial condition of the HMO). Id.
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justification for its coverage decision, thereby casting the decision
into the mixed eligibility and treatment category. Thus, while
Pegram does not preclude such a claim from being made, the
probability that the claim would succeed appears small given the
inherent difficulty in proving the ERISA breach.
2. Causes of Action Arising from Breach of the ERISA
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure-In determining whether Herdrich's
complaint sufficiently alleged a breach of Carle's fiduciary duty, the
Seventh Circuit sought assistance and instruction from Shea v.
Esensten which it characterized as concluding "that the defendants therein had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
to plan participants a secret incentive structure that provided
financial rewards to primary care physicians who minimized their
use of tests and referrals., 21 1 In addition to Shea, the majority relied
upon the Seventh Circuit decision in Anweiler v. American Electric
211th
Power Service Corp., in which the court held that an ERISA
fiduciary breached the duties of loyalty and care by failing to
provide a pension plan participant complete material information
regarding a pension plan reimbursement agreement. 212 However,
the dissent argued that any reliance by the majority on Shea was
misplaced because Herdrich, in her complaint, never asserted a
failure to disclose the financial incentives under which Carle's
physicians operated.1
In Pegram, the Supreme Court touched on the issue of
disclosure only indirectly. 214 Although it was not presented with this
issue for decision, the Court did note that "it could be argued that
Carle is a fiduciary insofar as it has discretionary authority to
administer the plan, and so it is obligated to disclose characteristics

209. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
210. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211
(2000).
211. 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993).
212. See id. at 990-92
213. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 383 n.2 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
214. In her complaint, Herdrich argued that Carle was judicially estopped from
denying its fiduciary status as to the decisions made by its physician-owners,
because Carle had sought and successfully defended removal of her state-law
action to federal court on the ground that it was a fiduciary with respect to her
fraud claims. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 227 n.8. The Court noted that "the fraud
claims in Herdrich's initial complaint could be read to allege breach of a fiduciary
obligation to disclose the existence of physician incentives to limit care, whereas
her amended complaint alleged an obligation to avoid such incentives." Id. The
Court concluded that because "fiduciary duty to disclose is not necessarily
coextensive with fiduciary responsibility for the subject matter of the disclosure,"
Carle was not estopped from contesting its fiduciary status. See id.
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of the plan and of those who provide services to the plan, if that
information affects beneficiaries' material interests., 215 One could
read this statement as a tacit endorsement of the reasoning of Shea,
which noted that "a financial incentive scheme put in place to
influence a treating doctor's referral practices when a patient needs
specialized care is certainly a material piece of information."216 At a
minimum, it should be read as a confirmation that the holding of
Pegram does not relate to breach of the ERISA duty of

disclosure.217
B. Breach of the ERISA Duty of Disclosureby an HMO's Failure
to Disclose its PhysicianIncentive Structure.
1. The Shea v. Esensten Decision-The Herdrich dissent
noted that until the majority's expansion of ERISA liability in that
case, Shea v. Esensten218 "stood at the frontier in terms of imposing
liability under ERISA on health plans that seek to control costs by
providing financial incentives to limit care., 21 9 With the Supreme
Court's reversal of Herdrich, the frontier represented by Shea has
been restored. To understand what that means for the plaintiff who
has suffered harm as a result of an HMO's failure to disclose its use
of physician incentives, a closer examination of Shea is necessary.
Plaintiff Dianne Shea was the widow of Patrick Shea, a plan
participant who died of heart failure a short time after his primary
care physician advised him, despite the presence of warning signs,
that referral to a cardiologist was unnecessary.22" Mr. Shea's HMO
("Medica") operated under an incentive structure that rewarded
215. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,227 n.8 (2000).
216. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
217. This result is implicit in the Court's holding that "mixed eligibility
decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA," Pegram,
530 U.S. at 237, because such decisions, by definition, are unrelated to disclosure
of the incentive structures that may inform the decisions.
For further analysis of the reach of the Pegram holding, see Thomas R.
McClean, M.D. & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of
FiduciaryDuty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemptionfor State
Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2001). Dr.
McClean and Professor Richards note that Justice Souter's opinion contemplates
HMO liability under ERISA for breach of statutory fiduciary duty only. Id. at 25.
McClean and Richards argue that the Court's silence with respect to the commonlaw obligations of provider to patient leaves open the possibility that fiduciary
common law could be used as a means of regulating both providers and HMOs.
Id. at 25-26.
218. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
219. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 384 (7th Cir. 1998) (Flaum, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
220. Shea, 107 F.3d at 626-27.
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primary care physicians for minimizing covered referrals to
specialists. 22' After Mr. Shea's death, his widow brought a wrongful
death action in Minnesota state court, in which she alleged that
fraudulent nondisclosure and misrepresentation by Medica
regarding its use of physician incentives limited Mr. Shea's ability to
make an informed choice about his medical treatment.222 After
Medica succeeded in removing the case to federal court on grounds
of ERISA pre-emption, Mrs. Shea amended her complaint to assert
223
that Medica's incentive system violated its ERISA fiduciary duty.
The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a
claim for relief on grounds that the details of an HMO's incentive
system are not material facts affecting a plan beneficiary's interest;
Mrs. Shea appealed.224
After determining that Mrs. Shea's state-law action was preempted by ERISA, 225 and that she had standing to assert an ERISA
claim, the Eighth Circuit considered whether Medica had a duty
under ERISA to disclose its "referral-discouraging approach to
health care., 226 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court,
holding that when an HMO's financial incentives discourage a
treating physician from providing essential health care referrals for
conditions covered under the plan benefit structure, these
incentives must be disclosed, and failure to do so is a breach of
ERISA fiduciary duty. 27 The Eighth Circuit relied on its earlier
decision in Howe v. Varity Corp.,228 in which the court stated that
the ERISA fiduciary duty of loyalty may encompass a duty of
disclosure, which it characterized as an obligation to advise a
participant of material facts that could adversely affect the
participant's interest. 29 The court also relied on the District of
Columbia Circuit decision in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of
221. Id.
222. Id. at 627.
223. Id. Apparently, the amended complaint did not assert a breach of the
statutory fiduciary duty established in 29 U.S.C. § 1104; rather, it asserted breach
of the common-law duty of disclosure incorporated into ERISA. See id.
224. Id.
225. The court relied on Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
for the proposition that ERISA pre-empts common-law causes of action if they
"have a connection with or reference to" an ERISA plan. See Shea, 107 F.3d at
627. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that a state-law claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation is pre-empted by ERISA. Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746,
753 (8th Cir. 1994), afJ'd,516 U.S. 489 (1996).
226. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997).
227. Id. at 629.
228. 36 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994).
229. See id. at 753-54. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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America,730 which stated that the duty to disclose material information "is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility," and "animat[ed]
231
the common law of trusts long before the enactment of ERISA.
The Eddy court found that this "fundamental common-law duty"
not only informs the statutory disclosure requirements of ERISA,232
but also that the duty "carries through in all of the fiduciary's
dealings with beneficiaries., 233 In reaching its holding, the Eighth
Circuit reasoned that a financial incentive system put in place to
influence a treating physician's referral practices when the patient
needs specialized care constitutes material information that must be
disclosed if the patient is to make a properly informed decision
about her own treatment choices.'
If Pegram has not affected the vitality of Shea, then an
aggrieved participant should be able to sue an HMO on the theory
that the HMO's non-disclosure of a conflict between its physician
incentive scheme and the participant's legitimate health care
concerns is an ERISA fiduciary breach. The scope of the disclosure
requirement depends on how broadly Shea's holding is interpreted.
The Eighth Circuit held that an HMO's non-disclosure of "financial
incentives [that] discourage a treating doctor from providing
essential health care referrals for conditions covered under the plan
benefit structure" was an ERISA breach."' This holding could be
read narrowly to mean that only physician incentives relating to
provision of diagnostic tests, referrals, and other ancillary services
need be disclosed under ERISA. On the other hand, the Eighth
Circuit found that "Mrs. Shea has stated a claim against Medica for
breaching the fiduciary obligation to disclose all the material facts
affecting her husband's health care interests." 26 In fact, Mr. Shea
had made a specific inquiry about the need for a referral to a
specialist; the Medica incentive arrangement, because it
discouraged referrals, was found to be a material fact affecting his
230. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
231. Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750. The District of Columbia Circuit found that the
fiduciary has a duty to disclose material information upon request of the
beneficiary, and depending on the circumstances, on its own initiative. Id. The
implication of the court's analysis is that those circumstances requiring fiduciaryinitiated disclosure exist whenever the fiduciary possesses material information
"affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not
know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection." Id. (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173, cmt. d (1959)).
232. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
233. Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750.
234. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997).
235. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
236. Id. (emphasis added).
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particular interests.237 It seems clear that any aspect of a physician
incentive scheme could be a material fact affecting a participant's
interest, depending on the individual circumstances of the
participant. This interpretation is also consistent with the court's
statement in Howe that the ERISA duty of disclosure applied to
any "circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the
relationship. 238
The more significant scope question is whether the Shea
disclosure requirement applies any time physician incentives
discourage the provision of essential treatment, including referrals,
or only following a specific treatment-related inquiry by a
participant. While the Shea court did not consider whether the duty
to disclose physician incentives applies in the absence of a specific
inquiry, the language of its holding can be read to imply that no
inquiry is necessary. The court held that a fiduciary breach occurs
"[w]hen an HMO's financial incentives discourage a treating doctor
from providing essential health care referrals., 239 Because these
financial incentives operate at all times, one could argue that the
duty to disclose should not be triggered only by a participant's
inquiry. On the other hand, the provider's referral decision in Shea
was made pursuant to a specific treatment-related inquiry, and the
incentives whose non-disclosure formed the basis of the plaintiff's
allegation of ERISA fiduciary breach bore specific relevance to the
subject matter of that inquiry.240 A narrow reading of Shea would
limit the applicability of its disclosure requirement to factually
similar situations.
2. Other Courts' Rulings on the ERISA Duty of DisclosureSeveral Circuits have found that ERISA fiduciaries have a duty,
grounded in the common law of trusts, to disclose material information upon request of the beneficiary; this duty may exist even
absent a specific inquiry when the information could harm the
beneficiary's interests.2 1' At least one federal district court has
followed the lead of the Eighth Circuit in extending ERISA
237. See id. at 628-29.
238. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 754 (8th Cir. 1994), affd, 516 U.S.
489 (1996).
239. Shea, 107 F.3d at 629.
240. See id. at 626-27.
241. See Krohn v. Huron Mem'l Hosp., 173 F.3d 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 1999);
Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 753-54 (8th Cir. 1994) affd, 516 U.S. 489
(1996); Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1994); Bixler
v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993);
Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1993); Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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fiduciary duty to disclosure of physician incentives by HMOs.
Others have acknowledged that ERISA may entail a duty to

disclose physician incentives in response to a participant's inquiry,
but• have
declined to recognize a general duty to disclose such
•
241
incentives. Still other courts have looked to the plain meaning of
the description of ERISA fiduciary duty in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), and
concluded that Congress did not intend to create a fiduciary duty of
disclosure. 24 The Fifth and Eighth Circuits, in particular, have

developed fundamentally different views on the question whether
ERISA imposes a duty on fiduciaries to disclose their physician

incentive systems
beneficiaries.245

to

health

care

plan

participants

and

In Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc.,246 an early post-Shea case in
which the plaintiff claimed that an HMO's failure to disclose the

nature of its physician compensation contract in plan literature was
an ERISA fiduciary breach, a federal district court declined to
extend ERISA fiduciary duty beyond the obligation not to mislead
plan participants about material facts.247 Weiss's chief argument
against an ERISA duty of disclosure rests on the language of

ERISA and principles of statutory interpretation; the court noted
that "the general language of a statute will not be held to apply to a
matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment. 2 48 The court then noted that if "Congress [had] seen fit
242. See Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D.N.H. 1997).
243. See, e.g., Peterson v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 00-CV-605,
2000 WL 1708787, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2000). In Peterson,the plaintiff alleged
an ERISA fiduciary breach for non-disclosure of physician incentives and sought
full disclosure of all material facts regarding such incentives as well as
disgorgement of profits arising from their use. Id. at *1-2. The district court
looked to Third Circuit precedent for guidance:
[Tihose Third Circuit cases which have addressed the duty to disclose...
have done so only where a plan participant makes a specific inquiry or
where the fiduciary knew of the plaintiff's particular circumstances
requiring disclosure and the non-disclosure resulted in a particular injury.
Further, while the Third Circuit is arguably willing to expand the
protections afforded by ERISA's disclosure provisions, its reluctance to
overly burden plan administrators with broad disclosure duties...
recommends against imposition of [a] blanket duty.
Id. at *7.
244. See, e.g., Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 754-55
(S.D.N.Y 1997).
245. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552, 554-56
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 12 (2000).
246. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
247. See id. at 754.
248. Id. (quoting Clifford F. McEvoy v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107
(1944)).
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to require the affirmative disclosure of physician compensation
arrangements, it could certainly have done so in ERISA §§ 101-111
[29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031].,24'9 Next, it noted that "the general
fiduciary obligations set forth in ERISA § 404 [29 U.S.C. § 1104] do
not refer to the disclosure of information" to participants, and
concluded that it would be inappropriate to infer "an unlimited
disclosure obligation" on the basis of general statutory provisions
that say nothing about such a duty.250 In reaching its decision, the
court also relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that ERISA
fiduciaries have no duty to disclose truthful information on their
251
own initiative.
While the Second Circuit has acknowledged that
"incentive programs may affect the decisions physicians make in
the treatment of their patients,, 25 2 it has not squarely confronted the
question of whether HMOs have an affirmative duty under ERISA
to disclose physician incentives.
The Fifth Circuit recently faced this question for the first time
in Ehlmann v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan of Texas,253 and held
that ERISA imposed no such duty.25 ' Mary Ellen Ehlmann, a plan
participant, sued Kaiser, claiming, first, that the HMO had a broad
duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 to disclose its physician incentive
scheme, even in the absence of a specific inquiry or other special
circumstances, and second, that the physician incentives harmed
participants by causing providers to minimize treatment, diagnostic
testing, and referrals.255 Ehlmann sought an injunction requiring
Kaiser to disclose full details of its physician incentive arrangements in literature provided to all plan participants. 256 The district
court dismissed Ehlmann's complaint on grounds that ERISA did
not impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure.257 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit examined the statute, and, echoing Weiss, noted that while
249. Id. ERISA sections 101-111, which have been codified as 29 U.S.C. §§
1021-1031, outline many of the administrative requirements and procedures,
including disclosure and reporting requirements, with which ERISA plans must
comply. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
250. Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 754.
251. Id. (citing Poccia v. NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996)).
252. See Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans of New York, Inc., 114 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.
1997). The Herdrich dissent argued that this language suggested "at least a
tentative acceptance of Shea's holding." Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 384
(8th Cir. 1997) (Flaum, J., dissenting), rev'd, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
253. 198 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2000).
254. Id. at 554-55.
255. See id. at 554.
256. See id. Presumably Ehlmann sought an injunction under the provisions of
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
257. Id.
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an HMO's

disclosure duties, these provisions do not reference physician
reimbursement plans., 258 Relying on the canon of statutory
construction that the specific language in a statute rules the general,
the court rejected Ehlmann's argument that a duty of disclosure
should be implied from the general fiduciary duty language of 29
U.S.C. § 1104.259 The court then cited Supreme Court dicta which it
characterized as "warning" that when "ERISA provides a section
specifically dealing with a particular information scheme, courts
should not supplement that scheme by reference to a far away
provision in another part of the statute. '' 210 In a footnote, the court
dismissed Ehlmann's argument that a distinction must be made
between ERISA administrators, whose disclosure and reporting
duties are detailed in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, and ERISA
fiduciaries, whose duties are addressed in 29 U.S.C. § 1104.26' The
court reasoned, first, that because "Congress was so specific in
detailing the reporting requirements of administrators, its failure to
address the same regarding fiduciaries suggests that the omission
was intentional," and second, that nothing in the language of 29
U.S.C. § 1104 provides a basis for finding a duty of disclosure.262
The court next addressed Ehlmann's argument that Congress
intended 29 U.S.C. § 1104 to incorporate the common law of trusts,
including the trustee's duty of disclosure.26 ' Relying on Fifth Circuit
precedent, the court noted that "Congress intended that [§ 1104]
incorporate the core principles of fiduciary conduct developed in
the common law of trusts with modifications appropriate for...
employee benefit plans., 261 It concluded that because Congress had
not modified ERISA to include specific disclosure requirements
beyond those enumerated in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, the court

should not do

So.26'

Finally, the court distinguished Shea by noting

that Shea involved a "failure to disclose material information after a
specific inquiry or other special circumstances" not present in
Ehlmann.6
258. Id. at 555 (referring to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031).
259. See id.
260. Id. at 555-56 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73,
84(1995)).
261. Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555 n.4.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 556.
264. See id. (citing Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th Cir.

1983)).
265.
266.

See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 556.
See id.
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C. What Must an HMO Disclose?-ReconcilingShea v. Esensten
with Ehlmann v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas.
Although Ehlmann filed a petition for writ of certiorari with
the Supreme Court, her petition was dismissed pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 46.267 Thus, the question whether, and to what
extent, an HMO's failure to disclose its use of physician incentives
constitutes an ERISA fiduciary breach remains undecided for the
moment. However, an examination of the issues and the courts'
reasoning in Shea and Ehlmann leads to the conclusion, first, that
the holdings of the two cases can be reconciled, and second, that an
HMO's fiduciary duty under ERISA includes, at the very least, an
obligation to disclose physician incentives when a treatment-related
inquiry is made and the incentive scheme could materially affect the
ultimate treatment decision.
The gist of the Fifth Circuit's argument in Ehlmann is that (1)
ERISA cannot be construed to impose a fiduciary duty of
disclosure of physician incentives, and (2) the cases relied upon by
Ehlmann in support of her argument that ERISA does impose such
a duty, including Shea, are factually distinguishable because each
case involved a specific participant inquiry or other special
circumstance absent in her case.26 The question presented in
Ehlmann was, in essence, whether an HMO must disclose physician
incentives to participants before the point at which medical services
are rendered.269 In contrast, Shea addresses the question whether
an HMO has a fiduciary duty to disclose physician incentives when
they discourage a treating physician from making covered
referrals. 70 Shea can be read narrowly, to require an HMO's
disclosure of physician incentives only after a specific inquiry by a
plan participant, or broadly, to require disclosure any time those
incentives are in operation."'
267. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, 121 S. Ct. 12 (2000).
Supreme Court Rule 46 provides for dismissal of a case (1) by agreement of all the
parties; or (2) by motion of the petitioner or appellant, absent a timely objection
by an adverse party showing that the movant does not represent all petitioners or
appellants. See Sup. Cr. R. 46.
268. Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552, 555-56 (5th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 12 (2000).
269. See id. at 554 ("Ehlmann sought... that Kaiser modify its member
handbooks and/or physician directories to fully disclose to all plan members the
bonus arrangements.").
270. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We next consider
whether Medica had a duty to disclose its referral-discouraging approach to health
care.").
271. See supra text accompanying notes 239-40.
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In one recent decision, the Eighth Circuit characterized Shea,
in dicta, as involving "a breach of the plan administrator's duty to
publish an accurate description of plan benefits to participants and
beneficiaries., 27 2 While it may be reasonable to argue in favor of a
broad disclosure requirement because an HMO's physician
incentives are always in effect, a reading that keeps in mind the
precise issue before the Shea court leads to the conclusion that the
disclosure requirement should be more narrowly construed. A
narrow reading of Shea is not necessarily disadvantageous to plan
participants. To the extent that a limited duty of disclosure would
reduce the incidence of harm of the sort that occurred in the Shea
and Herdrich cases, the requirement would benefit participants
generally, while aggrieved participants would still have a cause of
action under ERISA.
A Supreme Court decision upholding Ehlmann would not
necessarily have cost Shea its vitality. While Ehlmann suggests, in
dicta, that Congress did not intend, in enacting and subsequently
amending ERISA, to impose any duty of disclosure on ERISA
fiduciaries,273 it holds only that an HMO's fiduciary obligations
under ERISA do not include "a broad duty to disclose to all plan
members the details of its physician compensation and reimbursement schemes. 2 74 Assuming for the sake of argument that
Ehlmann's statutory analysis of ERISA is correct, its holding can
still be reconciled with a narrow reading of Shea.
Even Ehlmann's conclusion that Congress did not impose a
duty of disclosure on ERISA fiduciaries can be understood to apply
only to the sort of general disclosure requirement that Ehlmann
asked the court to impose. The Fifth Circuit first looked at the
language of 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) and found that while ERISA
explicitly imposed a duty of loyalty on fiduciaries, the statute is
silent with respect to disclosure.2 75 The court then compared §
1104(a)(1) with the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, which
contain extensive filing, reporting, and disclosure requirements for
ERISA plan administrators.276 It focused in particular on § 1022,
which details what must be disclosed in a summary plan description,

272. See Ince v. Aetna Health Mgmt., Inc., 173 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 1999).
273. See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555-56. The Ehlmann court placed great
emphasis on the fact that Congress provided detailed disclosure requirements for
ERISA plan administers, while omitting any mention of disclosure from the
enumerated duties of ERISA fiduciaries. See id. at 555, 555 n.4.
274. Id. at 556.
275. See id. at 555; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
276. See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
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as well as the federal regulations implementing this requirement,
and found no language to support a requirement that HMOs
disclose their physician incentive arrangements.277
Although

plaintiff Ehlmann correctly distinguished between the duties of
fiduciaries and those of plan administrators,278 who may or may not

be fiduciaries, the court was probably correct in finding that the
broad disclosure requirement sought by Ehlmann falls into the

category of disclosures governed by § 1022.

However, the

requirements of § 1022 have no bearing on the duty of disclosure
found by Shea, assuming Shea is read narrowly to apply only to
situations in which a treatment-related inquiry is made.
While the Fifth Circuit declined to hold that ERISA imposed
on HMOs a broad duty to disclose physician incentives, any
argument that ERISA imposes no fiduciary duty of disclosure on
HMOs is probably unfounded. Although its statement is dictum,
and it had no need to decide the issue, the Supreme Court
suggested in Pegram that an HMO could have a fiduciary duty of
disclosure to plan participants.279 In support of this proposition, the
Court cited Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 v.
Newbridge Securities, Inc.,280 in which the Third Circuit stated that
"under the common law of trusts, a fiduciary has a fundamental

duty to furnish information to the beneficiary,"

1

which includes

277. See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555. Section 1022(a) provides, as pertinent:
A summary plan description of any employee benefit plan shall be
furnished to participants and beneficiaries as provided in section 1024(b)
of this title. The summary plan description shall include the information
described in subsection (b) of this section, shall be written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be
sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the
plan.
29 U.S.C § 1022(a) (1994). Nothing in subsection (b) could be construed as
relating to physician incentive schemes. See § 1022(b). The Department of Labor
regulations accompanying § 1022, which outline the required contents of the
summary plan description in considerably more detail, are also silent with respect
to physician incentives. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (2000).
278. See Ehlmann, 198 F.3d at 555 n.4. Ehlmann reasoned that ERISA
administrators were bound by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, but fiduciaries were not.
See id. For the court's argument in rejecting Ehlmann's position, see supra text
accompanying note 262.
279. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000) ("[I]t could be argued
that Carle is a fiduciary insofar as it has discretionary authority to administer the
plan, and so it is obligated to disclose characteristics of the plan and of those who
provide services to the plan, if that information affects beneficiaries' material
interests.").
280. 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996).
281. Id. at 1180.
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"an affirmative duty to inform when the trustee knows that silence
Glaziers & Glassworkers relied on the
might be harmful." 2
Supreme Court's own analysis of ERISA fiduciary duty for the
proposition that ERISA incorporates the fiduciary standards
embodied in the common law of trusts.283 While the Supreme Court
has never addressed the questions presented in Shea and Ehlmann,
nothing in Pegram suggests an inclination to disallow the limited
duty of disclosure imposed by Shea. Therefore, even after Pegram,
the participant harmed by an HMO's non-disclosure of physician
incentives may have a cause of action under ERISA for breach of
fiduciary duty.
D. What Does the Shea DisclosureRequirement Really Mean for
Plan Participants?
1. Implementing the Disclosure Requirement-While it is not
difficult to imagine a situation in which an HMO's physician
incentive structure could be material to a participant's individual
treatment decision, thereby triggering the Shea disclosure requirement, how and when those incentives should be disclosed is
problematic. Disclosure can be made at several points in the
fiduciary-participant relationship: when the participant subscribes
to a health care plan, when he chooses a primary care physician, or
Arguably,
when the provider makes a treatment decision.'
disclosure of physician incentives can be accomplished most
efficiently at the point of subscription to the plan, by including the
282.

Id. (quoting Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d

1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993)).
283. See Glaziers & Glassworkers, 93 F.3d at 1180. See also Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 (1985) ("[C]ongress intended in § 404(a) [29

U.S.C. § 1104(a)] to incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into
ERISA."); Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent.
Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) ("[Rlather than explicitly enumerating all of
the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the
common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and
responsibility.").
284. See Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in
Managed Care, 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1999). Professor Wolf argues
that the duty to disclose information about a health care plan, including its use of
physician incentives and other cost-control measures, arises at various points in the
These include
See id. at 1675-77.
participant's decisionmaking process.
subscription to a plan, which may be coterminous with acceptance of employment;
choice of a primary care physician or group, and presentation of a health problem
to the provider. See id. Wolf frames the duty to disclose as a duty to obtain the
informed consent of the participant at each stage of the decisionmaking process.
See id. Only if the participant agrees, for example, to incentive arrangements
creating a conflict of interest, does the conflict become tolerable. See id. at 1659.
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relevant information in plan literature. A requirement of this sort,
however, is precisely what the Fifth Circuit refused to impose on
HMOs in Ehlmann"' Federal district courts in the Second and
Third Circuits have come to the same decision.286
Assuming that the holding of Shea is read narrowly to apply
only to situations in which a specific treatment-related inquiry is
made, the logical point of disclosure would seem to be when the
participant presents the provider with a health problem for
diagnosis and treatment. However, a requirement of this sort could
prove difficult to implement in practice. The implementation
problem becomes clear when one considers how physician
incentives might be disclosed to a participant in a plan administered
by an IPA-model HMO. Under this arrangement, individual
physicians contract with an IPA, which in turn contracts with one or
more HMOs for provision of non-exclusive care to participants.
The implication of this arrangement is that the individual provider
may have as patients not only participants in several different HMO
plans, but also participants in fee-for-service plans and private
patients. Because the physician has HMO and non-HMO patients,
and because system of incentives will vary from plan to plan,28
disclosure at the point of treatment presents problems of administration that may serve as a disincentive to disclose at all.
Given the difficulties associated with point-of-treatment
disclosure and the apparent reluctance of the courts that have
confronted the issue to find a fiduciary duty to disclose physician
incentives in ERISA, the best solution may be a statutory
disclosure requirement similar to the "broad" disclosure requirement rejected by the Ehlmann court.8 9 In 1997, the New Jersey
legislature enacted the Health Care Quality Act,2 ° which requires
MCOs to disclose to participants, upon subscription and annually
thereafter, general information about financial incentive arrangements affecting referrals by contracting physicians.2 9' The New

285. See Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552, 554-55
(5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 121 S. Ct. 12 (2000).
286. See Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997);
Peterson v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. A. 00-CV-605, 2000 WL 1708787, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2000).
287. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
288. See Orentlicher, supra note 40, at 158-59.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
290. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2S-1 to 26:2S-18 (West Supp. 2000).
291. See id. § 26:2S-5(a). This section, which governs disclosures required of
managed care plan carriers, provides, as pertinent:
[A] carrier which offers a managed care plan shall disclose to a
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Jersey legislation could serve as a model for other legislatures. An
alternative that could provide even greater benefit to participants
than disclosure of physician incentives in plan literature would be a
disclosure in the nature of informed consent. 2 Under this model, a
participant might be required to sign an acknowledgement of the
physician incentive system under which her health care plan
operates. Under either model, the participant would be armed with
information that needs to be considered in making a well-informed
health care decision.
2. The Limited Benefit of ERISA's Statutory RemediesAssuming that a participant makes a specific request for information, suffers injury resulting from non-disclosure of the HMO's use
of physician incentives, and files a claim against the HMO for
breach of ERISA fiduciary duty, the issue of statutory relief arises.
While ERISA provides a variety of statutory remedies, it does not
allow recovery of monetary damages by aggrieved participants. 29 A
plaintiff who is awarded relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) will not be
compensated for any specific loss; rather, the statute requires
restoration of losses, or return of profits, to the plan. 294 Thus, any
benefit to the individual plaintiff is indirect.
The plaintiff who seeks relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) can
recover the value of benefits due under the plan.9 While there
may be situations in which this is adequate, the more likely scenario
would seem to be the one presented in Shea and Herdrich: under §
1132(a)(1), Dianne Shea could have recovered the cost of a visit to
subscriber, in writing.., the following information at the time of
enrollment and annually thereafter:
(2) General information about the financial incentives between
participating physicians under contract with the carrier and other
participating health care providers and facilities to which the participating
physicians refer their managed care patients.
Id. § 26:2S-5(a). A "managed care plan" is defined as:
[A] health benefits plan that integrates the financing and delivery of
appropriate health care services to covered persons by arrangements with
participating providers, who are selected to participate on the basis of
explicit standards, to furnish a comprehensive set of health care services
and financial incentives for covered persons to use the participating
providers and procedures provided for in the plan.
Id. § 26:2S-2.
292. Informed consent may be defined as a transfer of information combined
with a seeking of consent; it usually occurs at the point of treatment, if at all. See
Wolf, supra note 284, at 1676.
293. See generally supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text for an overview of
ERISA remedies.
294. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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a cardiologist; Cynthia Herdrich could have recovered the cost of
an ultrasound examination. In neither case would the remedy
begin to compensate the plaintiff for the harm sustained. Given
this stark reality, the best relief that ERISA has to offer may -be the
equitable remedy provided in § 1132(a)(3).296 Under this section, a
plaintiff may seek an injunction to prevent continued violation of
ERISA fiduciary duty by an HMO. 297 At least one federal district
court, relying on Shea, has found that an HMO whose subscriber
agreement failed to disclose physician incentives, and otherwise
misrepresented the nature of the relationship between the HMO
and its contracting physicians, could be enjoined under ERISA to
prevent further fiduciary breaches.298 While § 1132(a)(3) does not
permit recovery of damages by the aggrieved plaintiff,29 the
injunctive relief authorized by this section may have the positive
effect of preventing future harm to all similarly-situated plan
participants.
Given that the remedies available under ERISA are far from
adequate, the best alternative for the aggrieved plaintiff may be to
bring an action against the provider and the HMO in state court
and seek to avoid ERISA pre-emption. But how is ERISA preemption to be avoided in jurisdictions that have followed the
reasoning of Dukes v. U.S. Health Care Systems of Pennsylvania
and disallowed state-law negligence claims against HMOs?'
Pegram may offer an answer. Pegram held that mixed eligibility
and treatment decisions made by HMO physicians are not fiduciary
decisions under ERISA;3 ' -therefore, claims relating to such
decisions, such as the claim at issue in Herdrich, are not pre-empted
by ERISA. Thus, while Pegram undoubtedly has closed one door
to recovery, it appears to have opened another door that previously
had been closed, at least in some jurisdictions: the state law
negligence action against the HMO.3"
296. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 125.
298. See Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 758, 761 (D.N.H. 1997).
299. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
300. 848 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1994). See supra note 77 for a discussion of the
Dukes reasoning. Dukes is a leading case standing for the proposition that statelaw negligence actions against HMOs on theories of agency or vicarious liability
are pre-empted by ERISA.
301. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).
302. See McClean & Richards, supra note 217. McClean and Richards argue
that "Pegram thus ratifies the current majority view of the appellate courts that
ERISA's preemption shield is not available for administrative malfeasance in the
delivery of health care." 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000).
According to McClean and Richards, Pegram "calls into question whether
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If an HMO can be sued under a theory of agency or vicarious
liability for the negligence of one of its physicians, then, arguably, it
can be sued under the same theory for the physician's breach of
common-law fiduciary duty, including the duty of disclosure.0 3
Thus, while the participant who is harmed by non-disclosure of
physician incentives may have an ERISA cause of action even after
Pegram,if the participant's claim alleges breach of the common-law
duty to disclose material information, ERISA pre-emption, and the
consequent limitation of available remedies, may be avoidable.
V.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

Since Pegram v. Herdrich,a participant who has suffered harm
resulting from a mixed eligibility and treatment decision made by
an HMO acting through its physician owners or employees cannot
sue the HMO on the theory that the decision, if influenced by the
physician's financial incentive to limit treatment, was a breach of
the ERISA provision requiring that fiduciaries act solely in the
interest of participants. If the harm can be attributed to a pure
eligibility decision made under the influence of a physician
incentive scheme, the aggrieved participant may still have a federal
cause of action after Pegram. However, the difficulties of proof
associated with this claim are likely to limit its practical value to
plaintiffs.
More importantly, Pegram did not affect the vitality of Shea v.
Esensten, the Eighth Circuit decision standing for the proposition
that an HMO's failure to disclose its use of physician incentives
constitutes an ERISA fiduciary breach. Even after Pegram, a
participant who finds himself in federal court may be able to sue the
HMO for non-disclosure of a conflict arising from its physician
incentive scheme that is material to the participant's health care
decision. Although Shea has proven to be controversial, if read to
impose a duty of disclosure only when the participant has made a
specific, treatment-related inquiry relevant to the HMO's incentive
scheme, it should survive a future challenge. While a reasonable
argument can be made that Shea's disclosure requirement is more
there is any ERISA protection left for HMOs and their physicians.., except for
pure eligibility decisions, which are almost never at issue in plaintiff malpractice
actions." Id. at 30.
303. See id. McClean and Richards argue that "nothing in ERISA would
prevent a physician from being sued in state court for breach of fiduciary duty."
Id. If the physician is found liable for a fiduciary breach under state law, the HMO
can be found liable under a theory of vicarious liability, assuming it employed the
physician or represented to the public that the physician was its agent. See id.
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extensive, a limited disclosure requirement still provides injured
plaintiffs with a federal cause of action.
Perhaps more importantly, a limited disclosure requirement
could reduce the likelihood of harmful or fatal acquiescence by a
participant in a mixed eligibility and treatment decision that may
have been motivated by economic considerations. Unfortunately,
however, the Shea disclosure requirement would prove difficult to
implement in practice. Therefore, to protect the majority of their
citizens who are participants in, or beneficiaries of, employersponsored health care plans, state legislatures that have not
addressed the issue should move to enact disclosure requirements
similar to those provided by New Jersey's Health Care Quality Act.
A statutory disclosure requirement could substantially reduce the
both the likelihood and the consequences of a "betray[al] by
silence" of the sort envisaged by Judge Cardozo more than 80 years
ago. 304
For those participants harmed by an HMO's non-disclosure of
physician incentives, ERISA offers little in the way of relief. While
the plaintiff whose claim succeeds may recover the value of plan
benefits denied and attorneys' fees, the real value of the ERISA
cause of action may be to prevent future harm to other participants
by way of an injunction. Given the reality that ERISA's authorized
remedies are limited, the goal of the plaintiff seeking meaningful
compensatory damages should be to avoid ERISA pre-emption
entirely. Paradoxically, Pegram may have made that goal more
achievable. Whereas many courts had held that state law actions
against HMOs were pre-empted by ERISA, Pegram removes
ERISA pre-emption from claims involving a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision-or what is arguably the most common type of
health care decision rendered in the HMO setting. While Pegram
may have left intact the ERISA action for non-disclosure under
Shea, the plaintiff harmed by non-disclosure may be able to avoid
ERISA pre-emption entirely by bringing an action in state court for
breach of the common-law fiduciary duty of disclosure.

304.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

